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20 April 2015 
 
The Hon James Wood AO, QC 
The Chair 
NSW Sentencing Council 
GPO Box 5199 
Sydney NSW 2001 
 
By email: sentencingcouncil@agd.nsw.gov.au 
 
 
To: The Chair, The Hon James Wood AO, QC 
 
Re:  Alcohol and Drug Fuelled Violence – Mandatory Aggravating Factor in 
Sentencing 
 
1. We refer to the Attorney General’s request for the Sentencing Council to consider a 
proposal from the Thomas Kelly Foundation to make amendments to the Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (‘the Act’) aimed at deterring alcohol and drug fuelled violence. While 
there are four Terms of Reference this submission deals with the first: 
 
1. Whether a mandatory aggravating factor should be introduced to s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 that applies where the offence involved violence because the offender was 
taking, inhaling or being affected by a narcotic drug, alcohol or any other intoxicating substance. 
 
However, we also comment on the broader subject matter of the reference, being ‘The 
Sentencing Council is to prepare a report on alcohol and drug fuelled violence…’, and 
comment briefly on Term of Reference 4. 
 
2. Both in the form in which the aggravating factor has been framed in the Terms of 
Reference and in substance the authors are opposed to such an amendment to the Act. 
 
3. Our interest in the subject matter of this reference is based on our collective expertise and 
previous research across a range of disciplines and topics, including criminal law and alcohol 
policy.1 Together, we are currently engaged in a cross-disciplinary study of the multiple (and 
                                                      
1 Illustrative publications: J Quilter, “Populism and criminal justice policy: An Australian case study of non-
punitive responses to alcohol related violence” (2015) 48(1) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 
24; J Quilter, ‘The Thomas Kelly case: Why a “one punch” law is not the answer’ (2014) 38(1) Criminal Law 
Journal 16; J Quilter, ‘One Punch Laws, Mandatory Minimums and “Alcohol-Fuelled” as an Aggravated 
Factor: Implications for NSW Criminal Law’ (2014) 3(1) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social 
Democracy 81; J Quilter, ‘Responses to the death of Thomas Kelly: Taking populism seriously’ (2013) 24(3) 





inconsistent) ways in which criminal laws in Australia, including sentencing laws, attach 
significance to   intoxication. Titled “Knowledges of ‘Intoxication’ and Australian Criminal 
Law: Implications for addressing Alcohol and Other Drug-Related Harms and Risks”, our 
research is funded by a 2015 Australian Institute of Criminology - Criminology Research 
Grant 20/14-15. This project will analyse three typologies of knowledge regarding the 
relationship between intoxication, anti-social behaviour and violence, and criminal 
responsibility, being knowledges: (i) embedded in criminal legislation; (ii) deployed in 
courtroom adjudication; and (iii) featuring in expert literatures. It will: identify areas of 
overlap, inconsistency, under-definition and lacunae; investigate how statutorily embedded 
assumptions about this relationship are operationalised in courtrooms; compare assumptions 
from law and practice with expert knowledges on intoxication-violence. It will identify 
opportunities for strengthening the criminal law’s capacity to meet community needs and 
expectations with respect to the attribution of criminal responsibility for alcohol-related 
problems. 
 
4. Our submission addresses first a number of problems with the form of the reference; that 
is, issues arising from the terminology that has been employed. We then discuss a number of 
potential problems with the substance of the key proposal contained in the reference: that is, 
the suggestion that a causal relationship can and should be established between an offender’s 
violent behaviour and the fact that s/he had consumed alcohol or other drugs (‘AOD’).  
 
 
PROBLEMS WITH THE TERMINOLOGY IN THE FRAMING OF THE 
REFERENCE 
 
5. Term of Reference 1 is currently framed as ‘a mandatory aggravating factor’. It is unclear 
what is intended by the word ‘mandatory’ in the context of s 21A of the Act. The current 
aggravating factors in s 21A(2) are drafted as factors the courts is to take into account in 
determining the appropriate sentence for an offence (see the Act s 21A(1) and (2)). Is it 
intended that by framing Term of Reference 1 with the word ‘mandatory’ that an additional 
factor of ‘the offence involved violence because the offender was taking, inhaling or being 
affected by a narcotic drug, alcohol or any other intoxicating substance’ is to be included in 
the list of factors in s 21A(2), or is another meaning to be attributed to ‘mandatory’ – such as 
to have a specific effect on the sentence? If the term ‘mandatory’ is meant to have a specified 
effect on the sentence, this would not only be contrary to s 21A(5), we would oppose such an 
inclusion for the reasons set out below (at [11]-[19]). In this context of uncertainty 
surrounding the meaning of the term ‘mandatory’, it is also unclear how the proposed 
amendment might interact with other components of s 21A. What might happen, for instance, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Criminalisation’ (2015) 37(1) Sydney Law Review 1; D Brown, D Farrier, L McNamara, A Steel, M Grewcock, 
J Quilter & M Schwartz, Criminal Laws: Materials and commentary on Criminal Law and Process in NSW 
(Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015); K Seear, ‘What do we really know about the “effects” of drugs? An argument 
for doping effects as co-constituted “phenomena”’ (2013) 2(4) Performance Enhancement and Health 201; K 
Seear & D Moore (eds), ‘Complexity: Researching Alcohol and Other Drugs in a Multiple World (Conference 
Special Issue)’ (2014) 41(3) Contemporary Drug Problems 293; A Laslett, J Mugavin, H Jiang, E Manton, S 
Callinan, S MacLean & R Room, The Hidden Harm: Alcohol’s Impact on Children and Families (Foundation 
for Alcohol Research and Education, 2015); C Wilkinson & R Room ‘Alcohol and violence: Relationships, 
causality, and policy’ (2011) 38 Contemporary Drug Problems 185; R Room, ‘Drinking, violence, gender and 
causal attribution: a Canadian case study in science, law and policy’ (1996) 23 Contemporary Drug Problems 
649;  R Room & and I Rossow, ‘The share of violence attributable to drinking’ (2001) 6 Journal of Substance 
Use 218.  
 
if a person was simultaneously intoxicated within the meaning of the proposed amendment 
and provoked by the victim, or acting under duress? Each of these is a relevant mitigating 
factor under s 21A(3), and could lead to very complex and inconsistent approaches to agency, 
capacity, responsibility and sentence.  
 
6. Term of Reference 1 refers to an aggravating factor ‘where the offence involved violence 
because the offender was taking, inhaling or being affected by a narcotic drug, alcohol or any 
other intoxicating substance’. It is unclear if the phrase ‘where the offence involved violence 
because’ refers to ‘categories’ of offences involving violence or the ‘violence’ is ‘because the 
offender was taking, inhaling or being affected by a narcotic drug, alcohol or any other 
intoxicating substance’. If it is meant that the aggravating factor only applies to categories of 
offences involving violence it may be difficult to isolate the categories of offences to which 
such an aggravating factor may apply. For instance, is the meaning of ‘offence involved 
violence’ meant to pick up the meaning of ‘offence involving violence’ in s 94 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)? This is different to an aggravating factor such as s 
21A(2)(b) which does not confine the offence category to which the factor applies but rather 
to how the offence was committed (ie it ‘involved the actual or threatened use of violence’). 
The factor is open, however, to the other reading that ‘the offence involved violence because 
the offender was taking, inhaling or being affected by a narcotic drug, alcohol or any other 
intoxicating substance’. If such a meaning is the intent of the reference, it is opposed for the 
reasons set out at [11]-[19]. The phrasing appears to be based on s 21A(2)(cb) of the Act 
where the factor that aggravates the offence is the offender causing the victim to ‘take, inhale 
or be affected by a narcotic drug, alcohol or any other intoxicating substance’. Such a factor 
makes sense as an aggravating feature because it involves a further ‘invasion’ or violation of 
the integrity of the victim; the same cannot be said for Term of Reference 1. 
 
7. We take exception to the phrasing ‘take, inhale or be affected by a narcotic drug, alcohol or 
any other intoxicating substance’ in Term of Reference 1. This appears to be modelled on s 
21A(2)(cb) - a context in which the phrasing makes sense. However, Term of Reference 1 
uses this phrase in a very different way: as part of an assertion that a causal connection can be 
made between the taking/inhaling, or being affected by the relevant substance, and the violent 
offending. If a new aggravating factor is to be added to the Act, symmetry with other criminal 
law concepts is desirable, and usage of the more common term of ‘intoxication’, as defined in 
s 428A of the Crimes Act 1900, is preferable: ‘… intoxication because of the influence of 
alcohol, a drug or any other substance’ where a drug includes one within the meaning of the 
Drugs Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 and a poison, restricted substance or drug of 
addiction within the meaning of the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 1966.  
 
8. In the context of criminal law, the word ‘narcotic’ is antiquated and rarely used. (We note 
that the World Health Organization (WHO) is also critical of the use of the term ‘narcotic’ 
imprecisely ‘to mean  illicit drugs, irrespective of their pharmacology’, and has recommended 
avoidance of the term altogether.2) The word ‘narcotic’ is not used in the Drugs Misuse 
Trafficking Act 1985 to describe any category of drugs. It only appears once in the Crimes 
Act 1900, as part of the definition of ‘intoxicating substance’ in s 4: ‘includes alcohol or a 
narcotic drug or any other substance that affects a person’s senses or understanding’. The 
                                                      
2 World Health Organization, Lexicon of alcohol and drug terms published by the World Health Organization, 
Available at: http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/terminology/who_lexicon/en/.  
phrase ‘intoxicating substance’ is used exclusively as part of the definition of a small number 
of offences where an element of the offence is the administration of alcohol, narcotics or 
other drugs by the offender to the victim. The express inclusion of narcotic drugs in this 
context may be regarded as making sense, because the focus is on the administration of 
substances to a person that will make them vulnerable to victimisation. This use reflects the 
distinctive characteristics of narcotic drugs as defined by the WHO: ‘A chemical agent that 
induces stupor, coma, or insensibility to pain’.3 The emphasis on narcotic drugs in the context 
of causing a victim to take such a substance in s 21A(2)(cb) makes sense, but not in the 
context where the reference relates to the offender and a connection being made with 
offences of violence. 
 
 
9. An additional problem with the intoxication terminology used in Term of Reference 1 is 
that no distinction is drawn between ‘self-induced intoxication’ and intoxication that is not 
self-induced. On the face of it, the proposed new aggravating factor may apply in both 
situations, an outcome which would appear to be inconsistent with the policy underlying the 
proposal: to treat a person who voluntarily consumes AOD and commits a violent offence as 
more culpable than a person who commits the same offence absent AOD consumption. The 
distinction is made in Pt 11A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Section s 428A defines ‘self-
induced intoxication’ as ‘any intoxication except intoxication that: 
 
(a)  is involuntary, or 
(b)  results from fraud, sudden or extraordinary emergency, accident, reasonable mistake, duress 
or force, or 
(c)  results from the administration of a drug for which a prescription is required in accordance 
with the prescription of a medical practitioner, a registered nurse whose registration is endorsed 
under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law as being qualified to practise as a nurse 
practitioner, a registered midwife whose registration is endorsed under the Health Practitioner 
Regulation National Law as being qualified to practise as a midwife practitioner, or dentist, or of a 
drug for which no prescription is required administered for the purpose, and in accordance with 
the dosage level recommended, in the manufacturer’s instructions. 
 
 
10. The proposal is also problematic for failing to recognise that in some situations it may be 
the interaction between prescribed medications and the consumption of non-prescribed AOD 
that is implicated in offending behaviour. Two recent cases are noted: Henderson4 and 
Martin.5 Although we draw no conclusions as to the appropriateness or otherwise of the 
outcomes in these cases we note them because they illustrate the importance of considering 
the interaction between prescription drugs taken for a medical purpose and intoxicating 






                                                      
3 Ibid; see also J Perl, ‘The physiology of alcohol and substance abuse’ (2012) 24(8) Judicial Officers Bulletin 
63. 
4 R v Henderson, 2012 MBCA 9.  
5 Tasmania v Martin (No 2) (2011) 213 A Crim R 226. Although Martin is not about intoxication, it raises 
questions about the effects of prescribed medications. For a more detailed discussion of the case, see: F Bartlett, 
A Carter, W Hall, ‘Voluntariness and Causation for Criminal Offending Associated with Treatment of 
Parkinson's Disease’ (2013) 37 (5) Criminal Law Journal 330-341. 
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP ASSUMED IN THE FRAMING OF THE REFERENCE 
 
11. The usage of the word ‘because’ in Term of Reference 1 appears to assume a causal 
relationship between the offence (of violence) and the offender ‘taking, inhaling or being 
affected by a narcotic drug, alcohol or any other intoxicating substance’. Similarly, the 
overall Terms of Reference refer to ‘alcohol and drug fuelled violence’ (our emphasis), 
nomenclature which arguably assumes a particular kind of causal relationship between AOD 
and violence (where AOD are the catalyst for violent behaviour). We have concerns about 
any approach that assumes such a relationship, for the reasons we outline below.  
 
12. There are four problems with assuming such a relationship or oversimplifying its nature: 
 
i. a simple causal relationship between AOD and violence is not supported by the 
literature;  
ii. there will be significant practical problems with proving the aggravating factor; 
iii. the inclusion of such an aggravating factor is likely to produce complexity and a lack 
of coherence in sentencing and in the criminal law more generally; and 
iv. the inclusion of such an aggravating factor may impact on guilty pleas, with a range 
of other potential unintended consequences. 
 
13. First, the scientific and social scientific research literature on the nature of the relationship 
between AOD, on the one hand, and violence, on the other, is the subject of considerable 
debate and disagreement.6 Importantly, as well, different substances have different 
pharmacological properties with complex and multifactorial biological interactions with 
humans, each of which need to be taken into account when assessing the nature of the 
relationship with violence.7  
 
14. A large body of epidemiological evidence at the population level does suggest a 
significant positive relationship between alcohol and violence.8 Importantly, however, 
population-level findings from epidemiological research regarding the alcohol-crime nexus 
need to be treated with caution. Even though epidemiological research may suggest the 
involvement of alcohol as a cause of violence this ‘does not mean that, at the level of 
particular events, the relationship is … necessary or sufficient’.9  
 
                                                      
6 C Duff, ‘The social life of drugs’ (2013) 24(3) International Journal of Drug Policy 167; C Smyth, ‘Alcohol 
and violence – exploring the relationship’ (2013) 13(4) Drugs and Alcohol Today 258. 
7 For a discussion, see, for example: AJ Heinz, A Beck, A Meyer-Lindenberg, P Sterzer and A Heinz, 
‘Cognitive and neurobiological mechanisms of alcohol-related aggression’, (2011) 12(7), Nature Reviews, 
Neuroscience, 400-413; J Kuhns, T Clodfelter, ‘Illicit drug-related psychopharmacological violence: The 
current understanding within a causal context’,(2009) 14  Aggression and Violent Behavior, 69–78; S Boles, K 
Miotto, ‘Substance abuse and violence: A review of the literature’, (2003), 8 Aggression and Violent Behavior, 
155-174; P Hoaken, S Stewart, ‘Drugs of abuse and the elicitation of human aggressive behaviour’, 28 Addictive 
Behaviors, (2003) 1533–1554. 
8 D Weatherburn, “What causes crime?”, BOCSAR, Contemporary Issues in Criminal Justice (No 54, 2001) at 
5; I Borowsky et al, ‘Adolescent sexual aggression: risk and protective factors’ (1997) 100 Pediatrics 71; J 
Grunbaum et al, ‘Association between violent behaviors and substance use among Mexican-American and non-
Hispanic white high-school students’ (1998) 23 Journal of Adolescent Health 153; K Oriel & M Fleming. 
‘Screening men for partner violence in a primary care setting: a new strategy for detecting domestic violence’ 
(1998) 46 Journal of Family Practice 493-498; I Rossow et al, ‘Young, wet and wild? Associations between 
alcohol intoxication and violent behaviour in adolescence’ (1999) 94 Addiction 1017. 
9 R Room & I Rossow, ‘The share of violence attributable to drinking’ (2001) 6 Journal of Substance Use 218, 
219. 
15. It is likely that the ‘association between alcohol and aggression may be the result of a 
complex interaction of a number of variables’10 including the social and environmental 
context for a particular instance of violence.11 In other words, and in recognition of this 
complexity, it is more appropriate to speak about AOD as conditional causes for violence. If 
the proposed amendment assumes a simplistic causal link between AOD and violence, as we 
suggest it does, then the response may serve to over-emphasise the role of alcohol and/or 
other drugs and under-emphasise the role of other factors.   
 
16. There are variations between individuals in the effects of a given dose of AOD, and the 
effects will be affected by ‘set and setting’;12 that is, the socioculturally-influenced 
expectancies of the AOD consumer and the social context of consumption and what 
follows.13 Further, different drugs have different pharmacological properties.14 Therefore, 
care must be taken in developing policy and law reform responses to complex and potentially 
unpredictable phenomena, such as violence, especially where those responses are overly 
simplistic and reductionist. Where policy, legislative and other justice responses are 
‘designed to address a “problem” based on a set of [potentially] unsustainable assumptions or 
assertions regarding cause and effect’ they may be ineffective.15 Indeed, policy and 
legislative responses may end up generating yet new problems, additional harms and other 
unintended consequences, rather than ameliorating them.16 In addition, by disproportionately 
focusing upon AOD as the origin of harms, other potentially significant factors might be 
neglected. 
 
17. Secondly, there will be significant difficulties in proving the proposed aggravating factor. 
We identify three reasons: 
 
a) First of all, there is no indication of what level of intoxication will be required 
before the aggravating factor is triggered. We note similar problems associated 
with the failure to define ‘intoxication’ in the new aggravated assault causing 
death offence in s 25A(2) Crimes Act 1900. For this offence, while not defining 
intoxication the legislature has provided a ‘presumptive conclusion’ in relation to 
an accused’s intoxication by alcohol where ‘… there was present in the accused’s 
breath or blood a concentration of 0.15 grams or more of alcohol in 210 litres of 
breath or 100 millilitres of blood’ (s 25A(6)(b)).17  It is also unclear whether there 
will be different tests and/or thresholds for different substances? If particular 
levels of intoxication are required, including, perhaps, different levels for different 
substances, what is the evidence base for same?  
 
                                                      
10 A Morgan & A McAtamney, Key issues in alcohol-related violence: Summary Paper No. 4 (Australian 
Institute of Criminology, 2009), 4. 
11 R Parker & K Auerhahn, ‘Alcohol, drugs, and violence’ (1998) 24 Annual Review of Sociology 291.  
12 NE Zinberg, Drug, Set, And Setting: The Basis for Controlled Intoxicant Use (Yale University Press, 1984). 
13 A Hart & D Moore, ‘Alcohol and alcohol effects: Constituting causality in alcohol epidemiology’ (2014) 41 
Contemporary Drug Problems 393. 
14 J Perl, ‘The physiology of alcohol and substance abuse’ (2012) 24(8) Judicial Officers Bulletin 63. 
15 K Seear, ‘What do we really know about the “effects” of drugs? An argument for doping effects as co-
constituted “phenomena”’ (2013) 2(4) Performance Enhancement and Health 201. 
16 K Lancaster K et al, ‘More than problem-solving: Critical reflections on the “problematisation” of alcohol-
related violence in Kings Cross’ (2012) 31 Drug and Alcohol Review 925; S Fraser & K Seear, Making disease, 
making citizens: The politics of hepatitis C (Ashgate, 2011). 
17 See J Quilter, ‘One Punch Laws, Mandatory Minimums and “Alcohol-Fuelled” as an Aggravated Factor: 
Implications for NSW Criminal Law’ (2014) 3(1) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social 
Democracy 81. 
b) More fundamentally, by what means will it be established that the ‘the offence 
involved violence because the offender was … [intoxicated]’? Presumably it will 
be insufficient to merely show that the offender had consumed AOD prior to the 
violent act in question. A causal relationship must be established. The aggravating 
factor will be legally and operationally unworkable because it will be near 
impossible to prove that the ‘offence involved violence’ because the offender was 
intoxicated. How could the sentencing court be satisfied that the offence of 
violence occurred for this reason, and not for some other reason (for example, 
tiredness, excitement, anger, fear and so on)?18  
 
c) In a related sense, how will questions of temporality be taken into account, if at 
all? Term of Reference 1 refers to the offender ‘taking, inhaling or being affected 
by’ alcohol or other drugs, with substantial ambiguity about when such 
consumption needs to have taken place in order for the proposed aggravating 
factor to be engaged. This uncertainty is of course compounded by the absence of 
any guidance as to how intoxication is to be established and/or what level, if any, 
of intoxication is required, as above. In any event, and to be clear, it is our strong 
view that legislative responses to violence should be sufficiently open and flexible 
to accommodate the fact that acts of violence are sometimes perpetrated by 
individuals who have consumed AOD at some time prior to the commission of 
those acts, but on other occasions the consumption is merely coincidental or 
incidental to the offending in question. In this regard, the recent case of the Irish 
brothers Barry and Patrick Lyttle is noted. Both had consumed alcohol before 
Barry punched Patrick in the head putting him into a coma. Reports repeatedly 
indicated that alcohol was not a factor in the violence.19 
 
18. Thirdly, the inclusion of the proposed aggravating factor is likely to produce complexity 
and a lack of coherence in sentencing and in the criminal law more generally. Three potential 
problems are highlighted here.  
 
a) The aggravating factor in Term of Reference 1 treats violence perpetrated while 
intoxicated as more serious and culpable than violence perpetrated while sober. This 
is problematic, in light of the expert literature (discussed above at [13]-[16]), and may 
also be regarded as adding inconsistency to NSW criminal law, which currently 
recognises that AOD can impair brain and bodily functions and that this may be 
relevant to the assessment of criminal responsibility. The possible cognitive 
impairment effects of AOD are accommodated via the ‘defence’ of intoxication in 
Part 11A of the Crimes Act 1900. Thus, evidence of intoxication may be used by a 
defendant as a defence to a charge of an offence of specific intent (being ‘an offence 
of which an intention to cause a specific result is an element’: Crimes Act 1900 s 
428B). Many offences of specific intent may be categorised as offences involving 
violence. In practice, the interaction between the proposed Term of Reference 1 
aggravating factor and Part 11A may be challenging. The following scenario would 
appear to be possible. A defendant on trial for an offence of specific intent might avail 
                                                      
18 See J Quilter, ‘One Punch Laws, Mandatory Minimums and “Alcohol-Fuelled” as an Aggravated Factor: 
Implications for NSW Criminal Law’ (2014) 3(1) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social 
Democracy 81. 
19 For example, see R Olding, ‘Alcohol not a factor in tourist's alleged one-punch attack’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 5 January 2015 available at: http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/alcohol-not-a-factor-in-tourists-alleged-
onepunch-attack-20150104-12hnmw.html 
him/herself of the defence of intoxication to deny that the relevant specific intent was 
formed (Crimes Act 1900 s 428C); that is, as exculpation. If the defence was 
unsuccessful and the defendant was convicted, or if the defence was successful but the 
defendant was convicted of a lesser specific or general intent crime, evidence of 
his/her intoxication could nonetheless, and perversely in our view, be relied upon to 
invoke the proposed aggravating factor during sentencing.  
 
b) The aggravating factor would also remove the common law’s more nuanced approach 
to the sentencing of offenders who were intoxicated at the time of the commission of 
the offence. Historically, sentencing principles have recognised the diversity of ways 
intoxication may be characterised in the sentencing process: it ‘might be aggravating, 
mitigating or neutral depending on the circumstances’.20 We note that in 2014 s 21A 
of the Act was amended to include s 21A(5AA) which now prevents reliance on self-
induced intoxication as a mitigating factor. The introduction of the proposed 
aggravating factor would further erode the more nuanced and context-sensitive 
approach of traditional sentencing law and practice.  
 
c) The proposal also addresses matters that have recently been considered by the NSW 
Court of Criminal Appeal on the sentencing principles applicable to cases involving 
public ‘alcohol fuelled violence’: R v Loveridge [2014] NSWCCA 120 and R v Wood 
[2014] NSWCCA 184. At a minimum, consideration should be given to whether the 
proposed intoxication aggravating factor is necessary in light of the sentencing 
principles articulated by the CCA in relation to general deterrence. In these recent 
cases the NSWCCA has indicated that significant weight should be given to the 
element of general deterrence21 when sentencing for matters involving fatal alcohol-
fuelled violence in public. In Loveridge the NSWCCA stated:  
 
104 This Court has emphasised that the principles of general deterrence and denunciation of 
crimes serve as a means of protection of the public: R v AEM [2002] NSWCCA 58 at [92].  
105 The use of lethal force against a vulnerable, unsuspecting and innocent victim on a public 
street in the course of alcohol-fuelled aggression accompanied, as it was, by other non-fatal 
attacks by the Respondent upon vulnerable, unsuspecting and innocent citizens in the crowded 
streets of King Cross on a Saturday evening, called for the express and demonstrable application 
of the element of general deterrence as a powerful factor on sentence in this case. …  
216 Secondly, the commission of offences of violence, including manslaughter, in the context of 
alcohol-fuelled conduct in a public street or public place is of great concern to the community, and 
calls for an emphatic sentencing response to give particular effect to the need for denunciation, 
punishment and general deterrence. The United Kingdom decisions involve statements of serious 
concern by the courts of the type expressed in this State in Hopley v R, R v Carroll and Pattalis v 
R concerning a similar form of violent offending. 
In Wood the NSWCCA confirmed this approach and expanded the need for general 
deterrence relating to unprovoked violence on public streets particularly where the 
victim is elderly: 
 
66 The need for general deterrence is not confined to alcohol fuelled violence but includes 
gratuitous, unprovoked violence on the streets, whether in city centres, or residential areas. People 
have the right to expect that their streets will be safe … 
 
                                                      
20 NSW Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 139 (2013), [4.21]. 
21 It is also noted that the NSWCCA also found that the sentencing judge had failed to take account of the strong 
need for specific deterrence in this matter: Loveridge [2014] NSWCCA 120 at [120]-[131]. 
67 This expectation gathers importance as the number of aged and vulnerable persons in our 
community increases. It must be clearly understood that violence towards the elderly will not be 
tolerated. In the circumstances of the present offence, a strong element of general deterrence was 
called for.22 
 
In both cases the sentences were significantly increased. 
 
 
19. Analysis of NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) recorded crime 
statistics suggests that nearly 40% of the approximately 65,000 recorded incidents of assault 
in NSW in 2013 were categorised as ‘alcohol related’.23 These BOCSAR data do not include 
other drugs, meaning that estimates of assault where alcohol or other drugs were somehow 
‘related’ may be even higher. In our submission, it is essential to consider the likely 
implications of a response to these phenomena that, while designed to deter alcohol and drug 
related violence, may instead produce other problems. We identify at least three possibilities 
here: 
 
a) Depending on the particular approach taken, there could be significant implications 
for sentencing. A very broad and complex range of offences are likely to be captured 
under the proposed amendment, including complex phenomena such as family 
violence. Again, depending on the nature of the amendment proposed, one possible 
implication could be a significant increase in the size of the prison population. 
 
b) The inclusion of intoxication as a mandatory aggravating factor may have the effect 
of discouraging guilty pleas, and reducing the availability of agreed statements of 
facts in which the offender stipulates to the nature or quantum of his/her AOD 
consumption leading up to the commission of the offence or other potentially relevant 
factors. Given that some 40,000 assault and aggravated assault charges are finalised in 
NSW courts annually,24 a reduction in guilty pleas would have negative implications 
for the timely administration of justice, and would be inconsistent with the objective 
of encouraging more, not less, guilty pleas.25  
 
c) Another possibility is that guilty pleas might instead be offered only if agreed 
statements of fact are amended to exclude reference to AOD (especially if, as we have 
suggested, there is ambiguity or uncertainty around issues such as the level of 
intoxication required and the stakes in terms of sentencing are even higher). 
Depending on one’s perspective, this may be undesirable from a policy perspective, 
with implications, as well, for sentencing, if indeed the prosecution sought to argue 
that alcohol or other drugs might be aggravating.  
 
20. Finally, although we have confined ourselves to Term of Reference 1 in this submission, 
we want to briefly touch upon Term of Reference 4 by way of conclusion. The overall aim of 
the proposed amendment (Term of Reference 1) appears to be deterrence and so the question 
                                                      
22 See also Attorney General’s Reference No 60 of 2009 (Appleby and Ors) [2010] 2 Cr App R. 
23 D Brown, D Farrier, L McNamara, A Steel, M Grewcock, J Quilter & M Schwartz, Criminal Laws: Materials 
and commentary on Criminal Law and Process in NSW (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015), 589-590. 
24 Ibid, 591. In 2013, 44,204 charges for non-fatal violence crimes were finalised in NSW: BOCSAR, NSW 
Criminal Courts Statistics 2013 (revised ed, 2014)). 
25 See NSWLRC, Encouraging Appropriate Early Guilty Pleas - Models for Discussion, CP15 (2013). The 
Commission’s final report on this reference was submitted to Government in December 2014, but has not yet 
been publicly released.  
of the extent to which the proposed amendment might deter violence, if at all, is a crucial one. 
As well as our concerns about the assumptions embedded in the proposed amendment and the 
over-simplification inherent to the proposed response, the international literature suggests 
that deterrence works to some extent under some conditions, for some kinds of offences and 
some kinds of populations, particularly when the punishment is swift and certain and 
relatively small, with the drink-driving literature being a useful case in point.26 Importantly, 
however, deterrence is less often seen with marginalised and young adult populations – in 
fact often not at all.27 Some of the most effective strategies for changing drinking behaviour 
and intervening in alcohol-related harms include changes to the price of alcohol, alcohol 
outlet density and liquor licensing.28 We would encourage a consideration of other 
approaches. In this regard, we note the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research recent 
report indicating that the 2014 lockout and last drinks laws ‘were associated with immediate 
and substantial reductions in assault in Kings Cross and less immediate but substantial and 
perhaps ongoing reductions in the Sydney CBD.’29 
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